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Over the past few years, the Law School Admission Council (LSAC) has 
undertaken several empirical studies on the law school climate for lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students. In a report that recently appeared 
in the Journal of Legal Education,1 several members of LSAC’s subcommittee on 
LGBT issues analyzed the data produced by these studies. The subcommittee 
members reported that, despite improvement in the past decade, LGBT 
students “still encounter[] substantial discrimination on law school campuses 
and in law school classrooms.”2 Indeed, “[n]early a quarter of [LGBT] 
respondents to the study reported that they had witnessed or experienced 
discrimination in law school because of their sexual orientation or identity.”3 
As a result, many LGBT law students “feel disenfranchised from their broader 
law school communities,” causing them to “not feel safe ‘coming out’ on law 
school campuses” and to “go back into the closet in law school.”4
In an appendix of “best practices,” the subcommittee members included 
a myriad of suggestions for improving the law school climate for LGBT 
students. Among them is a recommendation to cover LGBT issues in non–
LGBT classes:5
Inclusion of such issues is important for several reasons: (1) it serves an 
important expressive value because it signals the integration and value of 
[LGBT] perspectives by all faculty; (2) it helps validate [LGBT] experiences 
and makes [LGBT] persons visible in the classroom and larger community; 
1. Kelly Strader et al., An Assessment of the Law School Climate for GLBT Students, 58 J. 
Legal Educ. 214 (2008).
2. Id. at 214.
3. Id. at 221.
4. Id. at 214.
5. Id. at 241.
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and (3) it is relevant to the professional goals of many [LGBT] students who 
came to law school to advocate in this area.6
For these and other reasons,7 I include coverage of sexual‑orientation‑related 
issues in my tax courses, especially in my basic income tax and estate and gift 
tax courses.
Interestingly, I experience some of the same trepidation in raising LGBT 
issues in these decidedly non‑LGBT courses that many of the surveyed LGBT 
students reported.8 In the generally conservative environment of law school, 
I always have some concern about how students will receive the discussion. 
Given that I am open about being gay, will they tap into negative stereotypes 
and think that I am proselytizing? Will my credibility as a teacher be 
undermined in their eyes? Will the discussion remain respectful and will I be 
able to manage it appropriately? Will students complain to the administration 
that my class is too “political” or will my end‑of‑semester student evaluations 
be negatively affected?
For the most part, my fears were groundless. Bringing sexual orientation 
into the classroom has generally proved to be exciting, as I watch many of 
my heterosexual students’ eyes open wide when they become conscious of 
the practical, everyday impact of sexual‑orientation‑based discrimination on 
lesbians and gay men. For my lesbian and gay students, I hope that these 
discussions serve the expressive and validating functions described by the 
LSAC subcommittee members in the text quoted above.
To achieve these results, I find it important to keep sexual‑orientation‑based 
discrimination from being perceived as an abstract impact on some “other” 
person whom the students do not know and with whom they have no 
connection. To establish the personal connection that helps students empathize 
with lesbians and gay men as they face a hostile tax system,9 I use narrative to 
frame the discussion. Sometimes the narrative is my own, other times it is the 
6. Id. at 223.
7. Among the other reasons is an attempt to integrate my research and teaching interests. See, 
e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 Santa Clara L. 
Rev. 763 (2004). In keeping with this aim, it is worth noting that I also raise other critical 
perspectives in classroom discussions (e.g., those based on race, gender, and class), and 
I have been working on a critical tax reader with Bridget Crawford that can be used as a 
classroom supplement to provide a perspective on tax that is absent from most tax textbooks. 
See Critical Tax Theory: An Introduction (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 
Cambridge University Press, New York, forthcoming, 2009).
8. Only 43.8% of respondents reported that they were “very comfortable” discussing LGBT 
issues in class. Strader et al., supra note 1, at 225. The reports of a strong majority of the 
respondents ranged from “somewhat comfortable” (28.9%) to “comfortable in some cases, 
but not others” (14.6%) to “somewhat uncomfortable” (11%) to “very uncomfortable” (1.7%) 
discussing LGBT issues in class. Id. 
9. For an explanation of why I characterize the tax system as hostile to LGBT persons, see 
Anthony C. Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous 
Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 Tax Law 407, 422–36 (2008).
5story of family or friends, and yet other times I create a hypothetical situation 
for the students. Narratives provide students with concrete situations that, in 
most cases, real people have confronted as they apply the tax laws to their 
lives. Set against the general background of the “neutral” tax rules that we are 
studying, these concrete situations make it easier both for the students to see 
how differences in treatment play out and for me, as the teacher, to discuss the 
policy issues raised by differential treatment based on sexual orientation.
To help others interested in bringing sexual orientation and gender identity 
into their tax classes, I have identified several areas likely to be covered in 
tax courses in which a discussion of LGBT issues is relevant. This list is not 
exhaustive, but provides a starting point for thinking about when and how 
one might bring sexual orientation and gender identity into the tax classroom. 
At the same time, I would not (and do not) raise LGBT issues in class at 
every turn for fear of undercutting the intended impact of these discussions. 
Nonetheless, there is a distinct need to integrate at least some discussion of 
LGBT issues into the tax classroom. In fact, in one of the LSAC climate 
surveys, tax was the non‑LGBT course that the least number of students 
identified as addressing LGBT issues.10
The general areas of the tax curriculum that I have identified for inclusion 
here are: fringe benefits, health insurance, attribution rules, medical expenses, 
property transfers, and income splitting. In each of these areas, I first discuss 
the general tax rules that serve as the backdrop for the discussion. Next, I 
recount a narrative that—in a concrete, personalized setting—raises the question 
of how these general tax rules apply to LGBT individuals. I then explain 
how the rules apply to the situation faced by the LGBT individual(s) in the 
narrative. Finally, I explore some of the policy considerations that one might 
raise (or that might surface on their own) in the course of a class discussion of 
the narrative situation.
I. Fringe Benefits
A. Background
Under § 61, gross income includes all income from whatever source 
derived, including compensation for the performance of personal services. If 
compensation is paid in property or services, then the fair market value of 
that property or those services must normally be included in gross income.11 
Nevertheless, § 132 contains a series of exceptions to this general rule that 
allow employees to exclude certain fringe benefits from their gross income.
Section 132(a)(1) and (2) exclude from an employee’s gross income the value 
of any no‑additional‑cost service provided by an employer to the employee 
as well as the bargain element of certain employee discounts on property or 
services offered by the employer for sale to customers in the ordinary course 
10. Strader et al., supra note 1, at 224 n.36.
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.61‑2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003).
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of business.12 This exclusion applies equally to no‑additional‑cost services and 
discounts provided to the spouse and dependent children of an employee.13 
For this purpose, as is generally the case for federal tax purposes, whether a 
different‑sex couple is married—and, therefore, whether an individual qualifies 
as the “spouse” of the taxpayer—is determined by reference to state (and not 
federal) law.14
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
When teaching § 132, I always use the example of free air travel by airline 
employees because it requires students to sift through § 132 and the associated 
regulations to find and apply the relevant rules concerning the exclusion for 
no‑additional‑cost services. In doing the problems in their textbook,15 students 
learn how to jump back and forth within the statute—and between the statute 
and the regulations. They also quickly realize that this fringe benefit is tax 
free not only to the airline employee, but also to the employee’s spouse and 
children and, in contrast to all other no‑additional‑cost services, even when 
provided to the employee’s parents.16
Once we have completed the problems assigned in the textbook,17 I tell 
my students that my partner is an airline employee. The airline for which he 
works offers domestic partner benefits, which makes me eligible for free travel 
on that airline (as well as discounted travel on other airlines under reciprocal 
agreements). Because this is the first time we encounter the intersection of 
sexual orientation and tax in the course, I then tell my students about the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the 
United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only 
to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.18
Thus, even though my partner and I were married in Canada several years 
ago, I cannot qualify as his “spouse” for purposes of federal law, including 
12. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1), (2), (b), (c) (2008).
13. Id. § 132(h)(2).
14. Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981) (“We agree with the government’s 
argument that under the Internal Revenue Code a federal court is bound by state law 
rather than federal law when attempting to construe marital status.”); cf. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2008) 
(providing a federal rule for determining the marital status of same‑sex couples that overrides 
any inconsistent state rule).
15. Joel S. Newman, Federal Income Taxation: Cases, Problems, and Materials 114–15 (3d ed., 
West, St. Paul, MN, 2005).
16. I.R.C. § 132(h)(3) (2008).
17. Newman, supra note 15, at 114–15.
18. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2008).
7federal tax law. This means that although my partner’s parents and any 
children that we might have will all be able to take advantage of this fringe 
benefit on a tax‑free basis, I cannot. In fact, whenever I fly “free,” my partner 
sees the income in his next paycheck increased by the value of my flight,19 and 
his employer withholds additional taxes from his pay to cover what he owes on 
this increase in his income.
Students are sometimes surprised to find that the same holds true for same‑sex 
couples who have entered into a valid marriage in, for example, Massachusetts 
or Connecticut, because those states recognize same‑sex marriages for state 
law purposes, including for purposes of state tax law.20 In this respect, DOMA 
departs from the general rule (mentioned above) that the federal tax laws defer 
to state law on questions of determining a couple’s marital status. DOMA 
singles out certain marriages that are recognized under state law (i.e., those 
entered into by same‑sex couples) and denies them recognition for federal tax 
purposes.
C. Policy Issues
This differential treatment raises serious equity concerns. In its conventional 
sense,21 the tax notion of “horizontal” equity would seem to dictate that two 
similarly situated taxpayers with similar income should be taxed similarly. 
But, in this situation, my partner is taxed more heavily than his married 
heterosexual co‑workers receiving the same fringe benefit. The sole basis for 
treating these two taxpayers—who have received the same item of income 
from the same employer as compensation for their performance of personal 
services—is the sex of the respective taxpayer’s spouse. Under the applicable 
rules, a free flight provided to a same‑sex spouse is taxed while a free flight 
provided to a different‑sex spouse is tax free.
Interestingly, when my partner’s airline adopted its domestic partner 
benefits policy, it probably thought that it was eliminating just this sort of 
discrimination. The airline was trying to do the “right” or “fair” thing by 
providing all of its employees with equal pay for equal work; however, the 
federal government has foiled the airline’s attempt to equalize the treatment 
of its employees. Through the tax laws, the federal government has stepped 
in to reinstate the discriminatory treatment of the airline’s lesbian and gay 
employees that existed prior to the adoption of the domestic partner benefits 
19. The rules for valuing this benefit are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.61‑21(h) (as amended in 1992).
20. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Mass. Dep’t Revenue, 
Tech. Info. Release 04‑17, at ¶ D(1)(b)(i) (July 7, 2004); see Conn. Dep’t Revenue Servs., 
Connecticut Resident Income Tax Return and Instructions 13 (2007) (indicating that, even 
before the advent of same‑sex marriage in Connecticut, same‑sex couples who had entered 
into a civil union in Connecticut would generally be treated the same as married couples for 
Connecticut tax purposes, even though they were not treated so for federal tax purposes).
21. For a warning that care should be taken in applying the conventional sense of tax equity to 
members of traditionally subordinated groups, see generally Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 
55 Buff. L. Rev. 1191 (2008).
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policy. In other words, the federal government has ensured that, by reason 
of the application of the tax laws, the airline will still only be able to provide 
its lesbian and gay employees with a lesser fringe benefit package than the 
airline provides its heterosexual employees. By interfering in this way with an 
employer’s ability to equalize the compensation packages of its employees, § 
132 also raises serious concerns about the neutrality of the tax laws.
II. Health Insurance
A. Background
The tax treatment of employer‑provided accident or health insurance 
coverage is related to the topic of fringe benefits, though it might just as well be 
covered separately in connection with a discussion of the exclusion under §§ 
104 and 105 for amounts received by an employee through accident or health 
insurance plans for personal injuries or sickness. Again, as a starting point, § 
61 includes in gross income all income from whatever source derived, including 
compensation for the performance of personal services. If compensation is 
paid in property or services, then the fair market value of that property or 
those services must normally be included in gross income.22
Section 106(a) allows an employee to exclude from gross income the 
value of “employer‑provided coverage under an accident or health plan.” By 
regulation, this exclusion is expanded to encompass the value of coverage 
provided to the spouse and dependents of the employee as well.23 Thus, the 
value of an employer’s contribution toward accident or health insurance for its 
employees, their spouses, and their dependents is free of tax.
To determine the tax treatment of amounts paid out under employer‑provided 
accident or health plans, one must turn to §§ 104 and 105. On the one hand, § 105 
applies to employees who were able to exclude the value of employer‑provided 
accident or health coverage from gross income under § 106. Under § 105(b), 
the employee can further exclude from gross income payments made under 
the accident or health insurance plan for the medical care of the employee, a 
spouse, or a dependent. Section 105(c) additionally permits an employee to 
exclude from gross income payments compensating for permanent loss or loss 
of use of a part or function of the body or for permanent disfigurement of the 
employee, a spouse, or a dependent, so long as the payment is not computed by 
reference to the time absent from work. Under § 105(a), payments not falling 
within either of the foregoing two categories are includible in gross income. 
Section 104, on the other hand, applies to employees who paid for accident 
or health coverage with after‑tax dollars. Under § 104(a)(3), to the extent 
that an employee (1) directly paid for accident or health coverage and/or (2) 
was required to include employer‑paid premiums for such coverage in gross 
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.61‑2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003).
23. Id. § 1.106‑1 (1960); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.106‑1, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,421 (Aug. 20, 2007); Notice 
2004‑79, 2004‑49 I.R.B. 898.
9income, then a proportionate part of amounts paid out under that coverage 
for personal injury or sickness of the employee, a spouse, or a dependent are 
excluded from gross income.24
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
Many employers, including my own and my partner’s, now offer accident 
and health insurance coverage for the domestic partners of their employees.25 
We thus have a choice between two different health insurance plans, and it 
would seem to make sense for the two of us to opt for whichever plan provides 
the best coverage for the least cost. In terms of coverage, both my partner and 
I judge my employer’s plan to be the better of the two. But how much would 
it cost for my partner to switch to my plan?26
Currently, my partner pays $60 per month (deducted from his salary on a 
pretax basis) toward his health insurance coverage while I pay nothing toward 
mine. My employer subsidizes the health insurance coverage of domestic 
partners to the same extent that it subsidizes the coverage of the spouses of 
its married heterosexual employees. If I were to add my partner to my health 
insurance coverage, my contribution toward my health insurance coverage 
would immediately increase from $0 to $141. This is the same nominal 
increase that a married different‑sex couple would experience; however, my 
married co‑workers are able to have this amount deducted from their pay on 
a pretax basis.27 I cannot.28 If I were able to have this amount deducted from 
pay on a pretax basis, I would be able to save nearly $40 in taxes per month 
(assuming that my marginal tax rate is twenty‑eight percent). This means that 
my married co‑workers with the same marginal tax rate effectively pay only 
$101 (after taking into account the tax savings) toward their spouses’ health 
insurance, while I would pay the full $141 out of pocket if I were to add my 
partner to my coverage. Each year, I would pay a total of $480 more than my 
married heterosexual colleagues for the same health insurance coverage. This 
is a significant disparity and one that militates against the possibility that my 
partner and I would choose to add him to my health insurance coverage.
24. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.104‑1(d) (as amended in 1970); 1.105‑1(c), (d) (as amended in 1964).
25. Human Rights Campaign Found., The State of the Workplace for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual 
and Transgender Americans: 2006–2007, at 1 (2007) (indicating that a majority of Fortune 
500 companies offer domestic partner benefits).
26. For purposes of the discussion in the text below, I have omitted payroll taxes from this 
calculation because most basic income tax courses do not entail the study of payroll taxes. 
To raise this issue, one could mention that the amounts discussed in the text below actually 
understate the cost of adding a domestic partner to an employee’s health insurance coverage 
because of the need to factor into such cost the payroll taxes that would apply to the 
additional compensation income.
27. Rev. Rul. 2002‑3, 2002‑1 C.B. 316; see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125‑1(a)(2), (3)(B), 72 Fed. Reg. 
43,938 (Aug. 6, 2007).
28. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125‑1(h)(2)–(3), 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938 (Aug. 6, 2007).
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But this possibility grows increasingly remote once we add to the balance 
the additional income tax due on my employer’s contribution toward this 
coverage. Unless my partner were to qualify as my “dependent,” which he 
does not, the excess of the fair market value of his health insurance coverage 
over the amount that I paid toward that coverage would be deemed additional 
compensation income to me.29 My married heterosexual co‑workers who add 
their different‑sex spouses to their health insurance coverage are not taxed on 
this amount.30
Assuming that the fair market value of the coverage provided to my partner 
over the amount that I contribute toward that coverage is equal to the increase 
in my employer’s monthly contribution toward my health insurance coverage, 
my income would increase each month by the amount of $411. Again assuming 
a marginal tax rate of twenty‑eight percent, I would owe an additional $115 
in income tax each month on this amount. That brings the total cost to $256 
per month to switch my partner to my health insurance plan—this is two and 
one‑half times what it would cost my married heterosexual co‑workers in 
the same tax bracket to do the same thing. This creates a radically different 
cost‑benefit analysis for two otherwise similarly situated employees. In the end, 
we naturally decided that the enhancement in coverage that my (thankfully, 
healthy) partner would get from switching to my health insurance plan was 
not worth the more than $3,000 per year that it would cost us.
C. Policy Issues
The tax treatment of employer‑provided health insurance coverage raises the 
same horizontal equity and neutrality concerns that were mentioned above in 
connection with the discussion of the exclusion for no‑additional‑cost services 
under § 132. The tax laws draw a sharp distinction between similarly situated 
taxpayers receiving the same benefits package from the same employer—based 
solely on the sex of the employee’s spouse. This differential tax treatment either 
discourages the employee from adding her partner to her health insurance 
coverage or requires the employee to forfeit a significant additional amount of 
her salary (in comparison to her similarly situated heterosexual colleagues) to 
obtain the same fringe benefit.
Especially at a time when health insurance is near the top of the national 
agenda, the narrative in the previous section also raises an issue concerning 
the erection of senseless barriers to gaining access to the best available health 
insurance coverage. In attempting to convince an employer to establish a 
domestic partner benefits policy, one of the key selling points is that the cost to 
the employer is remarkably low. Indeed, one study found that nearly two‑thirds 
29. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003‑39‑001 (June 13, 2003). It is worth noting that, because the 
premiums for this coverage would be taxable to me, amounts paid out under that coverage 
for personal injury or sickness of my partner would be excluded from my gross income 
under § 104(a)(3). Id.; see also, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008‑46‑011 (Aug. 8, 2008); I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008‑41‑013 (July 1, 2008).
30. See supra note 23.
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of employers experience “a total financial impact of less than 1 percent of 
total benefits cost” and that “[r]ates of enrollment have not been particularly 
high.”31 The low enrollment is most commonly explained as a result of either 
(1) an employee’s fear of discrimination if she “outs” herself by asking to add 
her domestic partner to her health insurance coverage or (2) the availability 
of health insurance coverage through the domestic partner’s own employer.32 
Generally left out of the discussion, however, is the possibility that the tax cost 
of the benefits makes adding a partner—especially one with existing coverage 
through her own employer—prohibitively expensive, even if that coverage 
would provide better health care for the partner. Query whether the rates of 
enrollment for domestic partner health insurance coverage would experience 
a dramatic increase if the tax treatment of same‑sex and different‑sex couples 
were equalized.
The tax treatment of employer‑provided accident and health insurance 
further raises concerns about stigmatization. The only way around the added 
tax costs described in the previous section is for the lesbian or gay employee’s 
partner to qualify as his or her dependent for tax purposes. To meet this 
requirement, the employee must provide more than one‑half of the partner’s 
support, the two must share the same principal place of abode, and the partner 
must be a member of the employee’s household.33 Where both partners work, 
it will often be difficult to satisfy the support prong of this test. But, even if 
the employee does provide the requisite level of support and can qualify the 
partner as a tax dependent, what does this say about their relationship?
When one married different‑sex spouse provides the other with health 
insurance coverage through work, the value of that benefit is excluded from 
gross income regardless of whether both spouses are employed, regardless 
of their individual levels of income, regardless of their relative financial 
contributions to maintaining their household, and even regardless of whether 
they actually live together. Married different‑sex spouses are treated for this 
and other tax purposes as a single economic unit—two individuals working 
together (whether inside or outside the home) toward the common goal of 
making a life together. In contrast, same‑sex couples who qualify for the same 
tax treatment as married different‑sex couples are not treated as co‑venturers in 
this joint enterprise, but as a breadwinner and a “dependent.” A different‑sex 
spouse who works in the home is not labeled a “dependent” of the spouse who 
works in the paid labor market; she is still simply a “spouse” for tax purposes.34 
31. Human Rights Campaign, Domestic Partner Benefits: Cost and Utilization, http://www.
hrc.org/issues/workplace/benefits/4827.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).
32. Id.
33. I.R.C. §§ 105(b), (c), 152(a), (d) (2008); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.106‑1, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,421 
(Aug. 20, 2007); Notice 2004‑79, 2004‑49 I.R.B. 898.
34. I.R.C. § 152(b)(2) (2008) (“An individual shall not be treated as a dependent of a taxpayer 
under subsection (a) if such individual has made a joint return with the individual’s spouse 
under section 6013 for the taxable year beginning in the calendar year in which the taxable 
year of the taxpayer begins.”); id. § 152(d)(2)(H) (excluding spouses from the definition of 
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However, a same‑sex partner engaged in precisely the same work in the home35 
is labeled a “dependent” of the partner who works in the paid labor market—
as if the stay‑at‑home partner were contributing nothing at all of value to the 
relationship.
Finances are a source of stress in any relationship. The tax laws only 
exacerbate that stress when they mark one partner as nothing more than a 
financial drag on the other, regardless of the contribution that she makes to the 
relationship. Though same‑sex couples in this situation manage to circumvent 
the additional tax costs normally associated with domestic partner health 
insurance coverage, they still do pay a price—in terms of the stigmatization of 
their relationship—in order to obtain a valuable fringe benefit that is readily 
available to, and easily accessible by, married different‑sex couples.
III. Attribution Rules
A. Background
It is often said that our tax system is premised on the notion that all taxpayers 
are “self‑interested, unaffiliated individuals—the atomistic rationalists of the 
classic economic model.”36 When a taxpayer is dealing with strangers, this 
assumption might be correct; however, when a taxpayer is dealing with family 
members, this assumption is either incorrect or will likely prove incorrect, both 
because there is an affiliation between the taxpayer and the family member and 
because family ties may overcome self‑interest. Anticipating these possibilities, 
Congress has peppered the Internal Revenue Code (Code) with rules that 
take account of this probable lack of self‑interested, arm’s length dealing. 
For example, when a family member acquires the taxpayer’s debt from an 
unrelated creditor, § 108(e)(4) treats the taxpayer as having acquired the debt 
herself for purposes of determining whether she has discharge of indebtedness 
income. In addition, § 267(a)(1) disallows the deduction for any loss realized 
on a sale or exchange of property between family members, and § 1031(f) 
strips a previous like‑kind exchange between family members of the benefits 
of nonrecognition treatment if one of them disposes of the property received 
in the exchange within two years of the exchange. Furthermore, § 302(c) 
takes into account the ownership of family members in determining whether 
a corporation’s redemption of its stock sufficiently altered the redeeming 
shareholder’s interest in the corporation such that it should be treated as more 
akin to an arm’s length sale or exchange than a distribution of property from 
the corporation to the shareholder.
“qualifying relative”).
35. Take, for example, my sister, who, as described infra Part VI, was a stay‑at‑home mother for 
more than four years so that she could care for her and her partner’s children.
36. See generally Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 1529, 1538 (2008).
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Though many of the adjustments in the Code that take account of family 
relationships are—like §§ 108(e)(4), 267(a)(1), 1031(f), and 302(c)—in the nature 
of anti‑abuse rules, others are designed to benefit taxpayers. For example, the 
special estate tax valuation rule for family farms and real property held by small 
businesses in § 2032A applies only if the property passes to a “qualified heir,” 
who must be a “member of the decedent’s family.” In addition, a corporation 
that exceeds the 100‑shareholder limit on eligibility to make an S election can 
nonetheless elect pass‑through tax treatment if attribution rules bring the 
corporation within the limit. For this purpose, attribution rules in § 1361(c)‑
(1)(A) treat both husbands and wives and all members of a family as single 
shareholders. Furthermore, § 121(b)(2)(A)(i) allows one spouse’s ownership 
of property to be attributed to the other for purposes of determining whether 
the couple will be allowed one or two $250,000 exclusions from gross income 
for gain recognized on the sale of a principal residence.
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
While the legal relationship between husband and wife is always taken 
into account in the formulation and application of these attribution rules,37 
the legal relationship between two same‑sex partners (whether married, in a 
civil union, or in a domestic partnership) never is.38 This means that same‑sex 
partners are treated as self‑interested strangers for purposes of all of these rules 
that make adjustments to take into account family relationships. To illustrate 
the different ways in which these rules apply to same‑sex and different‑sex 
couples, I have chosen two of the rules mentioned in the background section 
above: From the anti‑abuse category, I will discuss the loss disallowance rule 
in § 267(a)(1). From the category of adjustments that benefit taxpayers, I 
will discuss the § 121 exclusion for gain recognized on the sale of a principal 
residence.
1. Section 267
I own a bit of stock in an insurance company that I inherited from my 
father when he passed away some eight years ago. (My father, who was 
never wealthy and never owned any other stock, received this stock when the 
insurance company from which he had purchased a small life insurance policy 
converted from a mutual insurance company to a stock insurance company.) 
This stock has plummeted in value during the past several months. If I were 
to sell these shares to my partner for their current fair market value in cash, 
I would realize and recognize a loss.39 I would be able to deduct that loss 
for purposes of computing my federal income tax (either against my capital 
37. See id. at 1541 (“Spouses are related parties for purposes of all related‑party rules applicable to 
individuals….”).
38. Id. at 1543 (“gay marriage by itself never invokes any related‑party rules—taxpayer‑favorable 
or anti‑abusive”).
39. I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2008).
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gains or, more likely, up to $3,000 of my ordinary income) because we are not 
recognized as “family” for purposes of § 267.40 In the end, I would be able to 
reduce my federal income tax burden without really parting with those shares 
of stock, which would remain within what I consider to be—notwithstanding 
Congress’s protestations to the contrary—my family. A married different‑sex 
couple in that same situation would be barred from recognizing this “paper” 
loss because they are considered family by § 267.41
2. Section 121
My partner and I each owned a home when we met. After we were together 
for a few years, we decided that it made sense for me to sell my home and to move 
into my partner’s home. When we first began discussing this consolidation of 
our living arrangements, my partner floated the idea of my simply moving in 
to his home without changing the title to the property, because a title change 
would trigger the payment of several thousand dollars of state and local real 
estate transfer taxes. (Though these taxes do not apply to transfers between 
spouses, they do apply to transfers between same‑sex partners.)42 As discussed 
briefly in Part V below, for tax and nontax reasons, we ultimately decided 
against this course of action; however, it is worth exploring here some of the 
tax reasons why we rejected this option.
In order to avoid potential gift tax issues from this arrangement, I would 
have had to pay monthly rent to my partner, and he would have had to include 
those rental payments in his gross income and pay income tax on them.43 More 
to the point, however, this arrangement would have required us to forego the 
ability to benefit (at least in part)44 from two § 121 exclusions for gain recognized 
on the sale of a principal residence. To benefit from the exclusion, § 121 requires 
the taxpayer to have owned and used the property as a principal residence for 
two years during the five‑year period prior to the sale.45 Even though both of 
us would have been living in the house and using it as a principal residence, 
my partner—as the sole “owner”—would have been the only one entitled to 
the exclusion under § 121 upon a sale of the property. In contrast, a similarly 
situated married different‑sex couple filing a joint federal income tax return 
40. Id. §§ 165(c)(2), 267(b), (c)(4), 1211(b).
41. The married different‑sex couple’s loss is additionally disallowed by § 1041, which is 
discussed infra Part V.
42. 72 Pa. Stat. §§ 8101‑D, 8102‑C, ‑C.3(6) (2008).
43. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (2008); see Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (intrafamily, interest‑free 
loan gave rise to a taxable gift in the amount of the foregone interest); 5 Boris I. Bittker & 
Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates, and Gifts ¶ 121.3.4 (2d. ed., Warren, 
Gorham & Lamont, Boston, 1993) (discussing the application of this case to the rent‑free use 
of property).
44. See infra Part V for a discussion of the impact of my partner’s sale of one‑half of his home to 
me on his eligibility for the § 121 exclusion.
45. I.R.C. § 121(a) (2008).
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would still benefit from two § 121 exclusions because the ownership of one 
spouse would be attributed to the other for this purpose.46 Whether a couple 
is entitled to one or two § 121 exclusions can be vitally important either in an 
inflationary market (e.g., the recent housing bubble) or when the couple lives 
in their home for an extended period of time.
C. Policy Issues
Naturally, these examples once again raise horizontal equity concerns.
However, they also highlight the intersection between sexual orientation and 
class and raise interesting issues concerning the influence of stereotypes on 
our thinking.
Though I have been careful here to discuss how the Code’s attribution 
rules provide mixed results for both same‑sex and different‑sex couples, in 
the literature, commentators addressing the application of attribution rules to 
same‑sex couples seem to focus disproportionately on the ability of same‑sex 
couples to use their exclusion from these rules to their financial advantage.47 
In other words, commentators focus on the ways in which same‑sex couples 
can “abuse” or “manipulate” the tax laws for their own personal gain. When 
these issues have arisen in class, I have noticed a similar focus in the thinking 
of students.
I wonder why so much attention is paid to the possibility for abuse or 
manipulation and so little attention is paid to the possibility that same‑sex 
couples are disadvantaged by their exclusion from the many attribution rules 
that are designed to benefit taxpayers. Is it because lesbians and gay men 
continue to be viewed as outsiders—operating not within, but outside and 
against the system? Or is it a relic of our not too distant history of being treated 
as criminals, who in one state deserved the possibility of being imprisoned for 
life until just a few short years ago?48
46. Id. § 121(b)(2)(A)(i). Moreover, the gift tax issue raised by the rent‑free use of the property is 
likely obviated for the married different‑sex couple by their state law obligation to support 
each other. Rev. Rul. 68‑379, 1968‑2 C.B. 414; see, e.g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4321(1) (2008) 
(“Married persons are liable for the support of each other according to their respective 
abilities to provide support as provided by law.”).
47. E.g., William P. Kratzke, The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) Is Bad Tax Policy, 35 U. 
Mem. L. Rev. 399, 436–42 (2005) (discussing how DOMA’s exclusion of same‑sex couples 
from the Code’s “unity of interest” provisions is bad tax policy because it allows same‑sex 
couples to manipulate the tax system in ways that Congress has deemed inappropriate for 
different‑sex couples); Anthony Rickey, Loving Couples, Split Interests: Tax Planning in 
the Fight to Recognize Same‑Sex Marriage, 23 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 145 (2008) 
(developing a tax shelter that exploits same‑sex couples’ exclusion from relevant attribution 
rules); Seto, supra note 36, at 1539 (“Here, I propose…to answer a single question: ‘Should 
gay marriage automatically trigger related‑party anti‑abuse rules currently triggered by 
heterosexual marriage?’”).
48. See Idaho Code § 18‑6605 (2008); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down the 
remaining state sodomy laws, including Idaho’s, as they apply to consensual sex between 
adults).
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I also wonder whether this focus stems from the stereotype of lesbians 
and gay men as an affluent group with a great deal of discretionary income 
at its disposal.49 Much of the potential for abuse and manipulation of the 
Code’s related party rules requires existing wealth or disposable income—
not to mention access to sophisticated (and expensive!) tax planning advice. 
Whatever its source, this disproportionate focus on manipulation or abuse 
that only a wealthy few can hope to execute successfully does nothing more 
than further feed and reinforce the myth of lesbian and gay affluence.50
When these issues are discussed in class, it is important to present a balanced 
view of how exclusion from the attribution rules can both benefit and harm 
same‑sex couples. If students’ focus begins to gravitate toward same‑sex 
couples’ ability to take advantage of this exclusion, it would be worth asking 
them to reflect on what is pulling them in this direction. Is their thinking 
subtly influenced by stereotypes about lesbians and gay men, and are they 
unwittingly feeding and reinforcing those very same stereotypes by allowing 
their thinking to be influenced by them?
IV. Medical Expenses
A. Background
Section 213 allows a taxpayer to deduct expenses paid for “medical care,” 
provided those expenses have not been compensated for by insurance 
or otherwise, but only to the extent that the allowable expenses exceed 7.5 
percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. For this purpose, “medical 
care” is defined in relevant part as an amount paid “for the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting 
any structure or function of the body.”51 This definition is qualified by an 
exception for amounts paid for cosmetic surgery. Thus, “‘medical care’ does 
not include cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or 
procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related 
to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or 
trauma, or disfiguring disease.”52 In this context, “cosmetic surgery” is defined 
as “any procedure which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and 
does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or 
treat illness or disease.”53
49. See David M. Skover & Kellye Y. Testy, LesBiGay Identity as Commodity, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 
223, 230–33 (2002) (discussing the commercial gains of the LGBT community that are fueled 
by this perception).
50. See generally M.V. Lee Badgett, Money, Myths, and Change: The Economic Lives of Lesbians 
and Gay Men (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001).
51. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2008).
52. Id. § 213(d)(9)(A).
53. Id. § 213(d)(9)(B).
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In interpreting the disallowance of deductions for cosmetic surgery, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has indicated that it will allow a deduction for 
expenses associated with breast reconstruction surgery following a mastectomy 
that was part of a taxpayer’s treatment for cancer.54 The IRS will also allow a 
deduction for expenses associated with laser eye surgery to correct a taxpayer’s 
myopia, but it will not allow a deduction for expenses associated with teeth 
whitening to correct discoloration due to age.55 In addition, the IRS initially 
disallowed a deduction for expenses associated with a series of surgeries to 
remove a mass of loose skin, which had resulted from an obese taxpayer’s 
loss of more than 100 pounds, on the ground that the taxpayer’s doctor 
had described the surgery as cosmetic in nature.56 The Tax Court, however, 
disagreed with the IRS and allowed the medical expense deduction because 
obesity is a recognized disease, the skin mass was a deformity caused by this 
disease, and removal of the skin mass was not purely a matter of aesthetics 
because the mass was prone to infection and interfered with the taxpayer’s 
daily living.57
B. How Does This Rule Apply to Transgender Individuals?
As of this writing, the case of O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner is pending before 
the U.S. Tax Court.58 Rhiannon O’Donnabhain was born male, but “had 
experienced extreme discomfort with her anatomical sex and felt a deep sense 
of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex” since childhood.59 Over 
time, these feelings only grew stronger and, to combat them, O’Donnabhain 
entered the military, then worked in the male‑dominated field of engineering, 
and finally married and had children.60 Yet, the “feelings of conflict with her 
body intensified, resulting in regular, severe emotional pain….The emotional 
turmoil increased to such an extent that by 1996, Ms. O’Donnabhain felt like 
her life was unraveling.”61
After her marriage ended, O’Donnabhain’s therapist diagnosed her 
with gender identity disorder, “finding that [she] met the criteria set forth 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 
Edition (DSM‑IV), and as a transsexual, in accordance with the criteria for 
54. Rev. Rul. 2003‑57, 2003‑1 C.B. 959.
55. Id.
56. Al‑Murshidi v. Comm’r, No. 4230‑00S, 2001 WL 1922698 (T.C. Dec. 13, 2001).
57. Id.
58. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, No. 006402‑06 (T.C. filed Apr. 3, 2006).
59. Petition at 3, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, No. 006402‑06 (T.C. Apr. 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/odonnabhain‑tax‑court‑petition.pdf.
60. Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, In re Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, http://www.
glad.org/work/cases/in‑re‑rhiannon‑odonnabhain/ (last visited May 4, 2009) [hereinafter 
GLAD].
61. Petition, supra note 59, at 4.
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transsexualism in the International Classification of Diseases–10.”62 In both 
cases, the standard for treatment required individualized assessment, and the 
treatment could range from hormone therapy, to living in the new gender role, 
to surgery.63 As part of her treatment, O’Donnabhain began to take feminizing 
hormones in 1997; legally changed her name in 2000, announced that change 
to her family and co‑workers, and presented as female in her daily life for 
at least one year; and then underwent sex reassignment surgery in 2001.64 
“Following her sex reassignment surgery, Ms. O’Donnabhain finally has a 
sense of comfort with her body. Feelings of conflict and pain have disappeared 
as she has succeeded in integrating her physical, mental, and emotional 
selves.”65
Given that her sex reassignment surgery was part of the medically indicated 
treatment for a diagnosed illness, O’Donnabhain deducted the costs of that 
treatment on her tax return under § 213. The costs for the surgery totaled 
approximately $25,000.66 O’Donnabhain was then audited. The local IRS 
office seemed willing to allow the deduction; however, after seeking advice 
from the Chief Counsel’s office, the IRS disallowed the deduction on the 
ground that O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery was “cosmetic” within 
the meaning of § 213(d)(9).67
Pointing to the legislative history, the Chief Counsel’s office found that 
Congress intended to allow a deduction only for medically necessary cosmetic 
surgery, such as:
(1) procedures that are medically necessary to promote the proper function of 
the body and which only incidentally affect the patient’s appearance; and (2) 
procedures for treatment of a disfiguring condition arising from a congenital 
abnormality, personal injury, trauma, or disease (such as reconstructive 
surgery following the removal of a malignancy).68
The Chief Counsel’s office concluded that “[t]here is nothing to substantiate 
that these expenses were incurred to promote the proper function of the 
taxpayer’s body and only incidentally affect the taxpayer’s appearance. The 
expenses also were not incurred for treatment of a disfiguring condition arising 
from a congenital abnormality, personal injury, trauma, or disease (such as 
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 5–7.
65. Id. at 7.
66. GLAD, supra note 60.
67. I.R.C. Chief Couns. Adv. 2006‑03‑025 (Jan. 20, 2006). Transgender individuals also face the 
same battle over whether their gender‑confirmation‑related care is medically necessary or 
merely cosmetic when attempting to seek reimbursement under state Medicaid programs. 
Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 Hastings L.J. 731, 783–88 (2008).
68. I.R.C. Chief Couns. Adv. 2006‑03‑025 (Jan. 20, 2006).
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reconstructive surgery following the removal of a malignancy).”69 Moreover, 
noting controversy surrounding sex reassignment surgery, the Chief Counsel’s 
office indicated that “[o]nly an unequivocal expression of Congressional intent 
that expenses of this type qualify under section 213 would justify the allowance 
of the deduction in this case.”70
C. Policy Issues
The application of § 213(d)(9) to O’Donnabhain’s situation raises 
an interesting issue of perspective; namely, from whose perspective is it 
determined that a given surgery is purely cosmetic in nature? As a starting 
point, it is interesting to note that Congress did not disallow deductions for all 
cosmetic surgeries. Instead, Congress chose to draw a line between different 
types of cosmetic surgery, making the expenses of some cosmetic surgeries 
deductible and disallowing a deduction for others. To be deductible, § 213(d)‑
(9)(A) requires cosmetic surgery to be “necessary to ameliorate a deformity.” 
Thus, a deductible procedure is one that corrects a defect in the taxpayer’s 
appearance that is visible to others; after all, a procedure that corrects a 
nonvisible deformity could hardly be called “cosmetic.”
In other words, a procedure that merely improves upon an appearance that 
others do not find misshapen or defective is purely cosmetic and, therefore, 
nondeductible; however, a procedure that corrects an appearance that others 
do find misshapen or defective is not purely cosmetic and, therefore, is 
deductible. As noted above, breast reconstruction surgery, laser eye surgery, 
and removal of a mass of skin from a patient with significant weight loss have 
all been found to give rise to a medical expense deduction under § 213(d)‑
(9). Interestingly, in each of these cases, the surgery brought the taxpayer’s 
body into conformity with general societal expectations of what a “normal” 
and “properly functioning” body looks like. That is, the breast reconstruction 
surgery restored the breasts that society expects women to have; the laser eye 
surgery allowed the taxpayer to go about his day without the encumbrance of 
eyeglasses or contact lenses that mark his myopic eyesight as defective; and 
the skin removal surgery gave the taxpayer the trimmer body shape that is 
considered “normal” in American society. In contrast, the teeth whitening 
did nothing more than improve an otherwise acceptable appearance. The 
taxpayer’s teeth were not defective; they had merely—and quite naturally—
changed color due to the passage of time. The teeth whitening might have 
improved the taxpayer’s self‑image, but it was not necessary to correct what 
others perceived to be a defect or deformity.
The IRS has placed O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery in the same 
category as teeth whitening. Because others do not perceive O’Donnabhain’s 
male body form as misshapen or defective, surgery to change that body into a 
female form did nothing more than improve or change an otherwise acceptable 
69. Id.
70. Id.
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appearance. O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery was not necessary 
to correct what others would consider a deformity—quite the contrary, there 
are many who would argue that her surgery actually deformed a perfectly 
acceptable body.71 Viewed from this perspective, O’Donnabhain’s perception 
of a bodily defect (i.e., the disconnect that she experienced between the form 
of her body and her gender identity) and the significant psychological distress 
that defect has caused her are, quite simply, irrelevant. Indeed, in enacting 
§ 213(d)(9), Congress attempted to distinguish between procedures that are 
medically (i.e., perceived by others as) necessary and procedures that are 
purely cosmetic (i.e., those that “are, in essence, voluntary personal expenses, 
which like other personal expenditures (e.g., food and clothing) generally 
should not be deductible in computing taxable income”).72
At first glance, this might appear to be nothing more than a necessary 
objective/subjective distinction necessitated by administrative concerns in 
dealing with expenses that might entail mixed (i.e., medical and personal) 
motives.73 Adopting an objective approach to determining whether surgery 
is purely cosmetic in nature certainly makes it easier for both taxpayers and 
the IRS to decide whether expenses associated with cosmetic surgery are 
deductible. Nevertheless, behind this apparently benign objective/subjective 
distinction lies a whole array of other, far more problematic binaries. As 
applied to O’Donnabhain’s situation, this objective/subjective distinction 
masks the privileging of physical health over mental health by allowing a 
deduction for cosmetic surgery that addresses a physical issue (i.e., breast 
reconstruction for a cancer patient) but not allowing a deduction for the 
same surgery when it addresses a mental health issue (i.e., O’Donnabhain’s 
diagnosed gender identity disorder). It also masks the privileging of a 
majority/hetero perspective over a minority/trans perspective by allowing the 
IRS, the courts, and society more generally to judge what a “normal” body 
shape is/ought to be for O’Donnabhain rather than allowing her to make that 
determination for herself. It additionally masks the privileging of a “natural” 
over a constructivist view of gender by equating birth sex with gender identity 
and refusing to accept the possibility of a conflict between the two. It further 
privileges the wealthy over the poor and working class by denying access to 
71. See, e.g., Margaret Wente, The Explosive Rethinking of Sex Reassignment, The Globe & 
Mail (Toronto, Ont., Can.), Aug. 25, 2007, at A19.
72. 136 Cong. Rec. S15711 (Oct. 18, 1990) (containing the Senate report for the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990). One might argue that the surgical expenses were voluntary or 
personal because O’Donnabhain was already presenting as female in her daily life before 
the surgery. But, under that argument, laser eye surgery is just as voluntary or personal in 
nature—and thus should be rendered nondeductible—because the taxpayer could just as well 
have affected others’ perception of the functioning of his eyesight by wearing contact lenses.
73. See, e.g., Pevsner v. Comm’r, 628 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1980) (indicating that, in adjudicating 
claims concerning the deductibility of expenses for business clothing, the courts have 
adopted an objective test for determining whether clothing is adaptable to ordinary street 
usage and noting the administrative benefits of this approach).
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surgery—for those who would choose it—to all but those who can afford to pay 
for it out of pocket.
Moreover, even if O’Donnabhain ultimately proves successful in obtaining 
a deduction under § 213 for her sex reassignment surgery, that success will 
come at the price of bolstering the medicalization/pathologization of gender 
identity and the concomitant reification of the rigid, male/female gender binary 
that the medical establishment promotes and polices through its treatment of 
transgender persons.74
V. Property Transfers
A. Background
Though the federal tax system is generally built around the notion that the 
individual is the proper taxable unit,75 there are a number of provisions in the 
Code that expand the unit to include a spouse (and, sometimes, dependents). 
These provisions treat the married different‑sex couple (or “traditional” 
family) as a single economic unit for tax purposes. Most visibly, the treatment 
of married different‑sex couples as a single economic unit is evidenced in §§ 
1041, 2056, and 2523.76
Section 1041 provides that no gain or loss is recognized upon the transfer 
of property from one spouse to the other. Sections 2056 and 2523 allow the 
taxpayer a deduction for estate and gift tax purposes for transfers made to a 
spouse or a surviving spouse. Taken together, these provisions allow for the 
transfer of property within the taxable unit (i.e., from one married spouse to 
the other) without triggering income, gift, or estate taxes. That is, a transfer of 
property will generally not trigger any of these taxes unless the transfer takes 
the property outside of the marital/economic unit.
In the case of the income tax, the married different‑sex couple is afforded a 
grace period following the dissolution of their relationship during which they 
will continue to be treated as a single economic unit despite their estrangement. 
Section 1041(a) creates this grace period by not only covering transfers between 
spouses, but also transfers between former spouses that are incident to divorce. 
For this purpose, a transfer is incident to divorce if it “occurs within 1 year after 
the date on which the marriage ceases” or if it “is related to the cessation of the 
74. See generally Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 Berkeley Women’s 
L.J. 15 (2003).
75. See 1 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 43, ¶ 2.3 (“From its inception,…the federal income tax has 
been based on the…view that every individual should be permitted to file a personal income 
tax return embracing his or her own income but not the income of the taxpayer’s spouse, 
children, or other relatives.”).
76. “The committee believes that a husband and wife should be treated as one economic unit for 
purposes of estate and gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax purposes. Accordingly, 
no tax should be imposed on transfers between a husband and wife.” S. Rep. No. 97‑144, at 
127 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 228.
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marriage.”77 The former category of transfers (i.e., those occurring within one 
year of the cessation of the marriage) actually covers any transfer of property 
between the former spouses, regardless of whether it is actually related to the 
divorce.78 Transfers occurring after this one‑year period elapses are presumed 
to be related to the cessation of the marriage if they are made pursuant to a 
divorce or separation instrument and occur within six years of the cessation of 
the marriage.79
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
Simply put, these rules have absolutely no application to same‑sex couples. 
Rather than being treated as a single economic unit, same‑sex couples (and 
others in nontraditional family arrangements) are treated as legal strangers 
to each other for tax purposes. In the absence of the protection of §§ 1041, 
2056, and 2523, a transfer of property from one member of a same‑sex couple 
to another will be a taxable event. It will either trigger income tax (in the case 
of a sale or other disposition), gift or estate tax (in the case of a gratuitous 
transfer), or a combination of income and transfer taxes (in the case of a 
part‑sale, part‑gift).
Consider, for example, what occurred when my partner and I consolidated 
homes in Pittsburgh. As discussed above, we each owned a home before we 
met. Eventually, we decided that it made sense to sell my home and for me 
to move into my partner’s home. As part of the move—and to signify that my 
partner’s home would no longer be his home, but our home—he conveyed the 
property to the two of us as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
If my partner had made this conveyance gratuitously, the transfer of 
one‑half of the property to me as a joint tenant with a right of survivorship 
would have triggered gift tax.80 The gift tax unified credit would have applied 
to this transfer and sheltered us from the actual payment of tax; however, the 
transfer would have significantly reduced the amount of property that my 
partner could transfer free of gift tax over the remainder of his lifetime without 
the payment of tax.81 A similar transfer from a wife to a husband would be 
completely protected from gift tax by § 2523.82 As a result, the wife’s gift tax 
77. I.R.C. § 1041(c) (2008).
78. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041‑1T, Q&A‑6 (as amended in 2003).
79. Id. at Q&A‑7.
80. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511‑1(e), (h)(5) (as amended in 1997). Pennsylvania permits joint tenants 
with right of survivorship to unilaterally sever the tenancy, see, e.g., Vegas v. Brinton, 451 A.2d 
687, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), which would mean that one‑half of the value of the property 
would have been subject to gift tax.
81. I.R.C. § 2505(a) (2008). When considered in light of the discussion of income splitting, infra 
Part VI, this can be a significant concern even for middle‑income same‑sex couples.
82. See I.R.C. § 2523(d) (2008) (taking such a transfer out of the exception for terminable 
interests).
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unified credit would remain untouched, enlarging the amount that she could 
transfer over her lifetime free of gift tax.
Instead, we chose to have my partner sell me a one‑half interest in his home. 
Fortunately, the net proceeds of the sale of my prior home were sufficient to 
cover the cost of purchasing one‑half of my partner’s home; otherwise, we 
would have had to come up with some sort of a financing arrangement.83 By 
purchasing a one‑half interest in the home for its fair market value, we were 
able to avoid the specter of the gift tax84—but at the price of triggering the 
income tax. At the time of the transfer, my partner was required to reckon up 
his gain or loss on this sale of a one‑half interest in our home. Though the gain 
was significant, he did qualify for relief from income tax under § 121, which 
allows an individual to exclude the first $250,000 of gain on the sale of his 
principal residence once every two years.85
Again, however, this ability to avoid paying tax now will have repercussions 
later. The IRS has taken the position that my partner only gets one $250,000 
exclusion under § 121 with respect to our home—no matter how long the interval 
between this and any other sale.86 In other words, he gets only one exclusion 
even if the sale of our home to a third party takes place more than two years 
after my purchase of a one‑half interest in the home. This means that when we 
sell the house in the future, he will only be entitled to exclude so much of his 
one‑half of the gain as does not exceed the portion of the $250,000 exclusion 
that remained to him after I purchased my one‑half interest. A similar sale 
from a wife to a husband would have been completely protected from income 
tax by § 1041, leaving the wife’s § 121 exclusion untouched and fully available 
for use on a later sale of the home to a third party.
If, at some point, my partner and I were to decide to dissolve our marriage, 
we would have to be concerned about the potential tax consequences of 
dividing our property between us. If we were content with continuing to own 
our home (and, say, rent it out to a third party), we could simply sever our joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship and own the property as tenants in common. 
83. Either I would have had to obtain a loan from a bank or borrow the money from my partner. 
Going to a bank would have meant incurring any fees associated with obtaining a home 
loan and paying interest to the bank. By borrowing the money from my partner, I would 
have been able to avoid the bank fees, but I would still have had to pay him interest that he 
would have had to include in his gross income. Id. § 61(a)(4). In either case, I might have 
been able to deduct the interest payments, see id. § 163(h)(3); however, that deduction would 
have reduced, but not eliminated, this cost. Moreover, the interest rate on any loan from my 
partner would, at least, have had to equal the “applicable federal rate” in order to avoid the 
application of § 7872, which looks to the nature of the transaction (and not the relationship 
between the parties) and would have subjected my partner to income and gift tax on any 
foregone interest.
84. Cf. id. § 2512(b); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512‑8 (as amended in 1992).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.121‑4(e) (as amended in 2002).
86. T.D. 9030, 2003‑8 I.R.B. 495, 497–98.
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This severance would not be a taxable event for income tax purposes.87 If, 
however, we were not content to remain as co‑owners of the home and one of 
us were to buy out the other’s interest, that sale of one‑half of the home would 
be a taxable event (subject to the—in my partner’s case, limited—application of 
the § 121 exclusion). A divorcing different‑sex couple would be protected from 
income tax by § 1041 in this case.
If the two of us were instead to live a happy life together for decades to 
come, the existence of the right of survivorship could come back to haunt us 
at the time that the first of us passes away. Under § 2040(a), the entire value of 
the home would be included in the gross estate of the first to pass away, unless 
his executor could demonstrate the extent to which the survivor actually 
contributed (out of the survivor’s own funds) to the purchase or improvement 
of the property.88 With the passage of decades, the documents that evidence 
our respective contributions toward the purchase or improvement of our home 
could easily have been lost, destroyed, or disappeared. This would make 
carrying the burden of proof difficult, if not impossible—especially given “that 
the IRS has never provided any guidelines for what would be an acceptable 
level of proof when two partners have owned property jointly for many 
years.”89 This could mean that the first of us to pass away would be required to 
pay estate tax on property that really belongs to the survivor. In the case of a 
married different‑sex couple, § 2040(b) provides simplified rules for property 
held by the couple as joint tenants with right of survivorship, because the 
existence of § 2056 renders an inclusion in the gross estate all but irrelevant:
The committee believes that the taxation of jointly held property between 
spouses is complicated unnecessarily. Often such assets are purchased with 
joint funds making it difficult to trace individual contributions. In light of the 
unlimited marital deduction…, the taxation of jointly held property between 
spouses is only relevant for determining the basis of property to the survivor 
(under sec. 1014) and…certain [other] provisions. Accordingly, the committee 
believes it appropriate to adopt an easily administered rule under which 
each spouse would be considered to own one‑half of jointly held property 
regardless of which spouse furnished the consideration for the property.90
C. Policy Issues
Again, with similarly situated taxpayers receiving different tax treatment, 
the drumbeat of horizontal equity concerns continues to sound. But this 
difference in treatment also raises other interesting policy concerns. At one 
level, drawing on typical tax policy goals, this difference raises a question of tax 
87. Rev. Rul. 56‑437, 1956‑2 C.B. 507.
88. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040‑1(a)(2) (as amended in 1960).
89. Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 Clev. St. L. Rev. 677, 694 
(2000).
90. S. Rep. No. 97‑144, at 127 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 228.
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neutrality. Sections 1041, 2056, and 2523 allow married different‑sex couples to 
treat tax as a neutral factor in arranging and rearranging both the ownership of 
property as between themselves and the form of that ownership (e.g., separate 
ownership v. tenancy in common v. joint tenancy with right of survivorship 
or tenancy by the entirety). When same‑sex couples wish to undertake such 
economic arranging and rearranging between themselves, they will find that 
tax is far from a neutral factor—indeed, it can act as a strong impediment to 
achieving what the couple views as the most efficient ownership structure for 
their property.
At a deeper level, one can see that more insidious issues arise regarding the 
integrity of the couple. Taken together, §§ 1041, 2056, and 2523 afford married 
different‑sex couples a certain “zone of privacy” because, having made transfers 
of property within the couple wholly nontaxable events, Congress has carved 
out a space in which different‑sex couples need not worry about the prying 
eyes of the government intruding in their private financial dealings.91 After 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,92 same‑sex couples thought 
that they had finally banished the prying eyes of the government from their 
homes. Not so. The IRS can still knock on the door of a same‑sex couple (or a 
grieving surviving same‑sex partner), come in, and probe all of their financial 
dealings with one another—because those dealings have tax consequences and 
are, therefore, considered a legitimate topic of government inquiry.93
VI. Income Splitting
A. Background
The ability of married different‑sex couples to file a joint federal income tax 
return under § 6013 is another example of the treatment of such couples as a 
single economic unit. The joint return is designed to allow “a husband and 
wife”94 to split their income between them for federal income tax purposes. 
In effect, “[j]oint returns subject all married couples with the same amount of 
taxable income to the same tax liability, regardless of how their income and 
deductions are divided between them.”95 As a result, “married couples…have 
no incentive to engage in income‑splitting devices to shift income from one 
91. Naturally, different‑sex couples are subject to estate tax audits; however, outright transfers 
of property within the couple will not be an issue in those audits because such transfers are 
not subject to tax. Different‑sex couples need only be audited with respect to transfers that 
take property outside the couple. In contrast, same‑sex couples are subject to tax and audit 
on all transfers, whether the property remains within or is taken outside the couple.
92. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
93. To get a sense of what this intrusion might look like, see Cain, supra note 89, at 696–97, which 
provides a series of short narratives based on stories from lawyers and accountants who have 
represented lesbian and gay clients in estate tax audits.
94. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2008).
95. 4A Bittker & Lokken, supra note 43, ¶ 111.3.2.1.
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spouse to the other because the joint return itself is an efficient income‑splitting 
device.”96 This ability to split income can continue even after the marriage 
ends, if one spouse pays the other alimony and the couple elects into the 
alimony inclusion–deduction regime established by §§ 71 and 215.
Overall, the ability to split income may be a positive, negative, or neutral 
tax aspect of marriage.97 For some couples, the ability to split income provides 
a marriage bonus, meaning that they pay less tax as a married couple than they 
would if they were unmarried and each filed “single” tax returns. This marriage 
bonus is largest for couples in which only one spouse earns income. For other 
couples, filing a joint return means paying more tax as a married couple than 
they would if they had remained unmarried and each filed a “single” return. 
This marriage penalty is largest for couples with equal incomes.98 Yet other 
couples find themselves in a situation where filing a joint return produces 
neither a marriage penalty nor a marriage bonus.
However flawed and criticized it might be on other grounds,99 the 
income‑splitting privilege provided by the joint return contributes to rendering 
tax a neutral factor in decisions about whether and to what extent the couple 
will pool their finances. In other words, when filing a joint return, the couple 
is treated as if they split their income equally between them, regardless of 
whether they (1) actually do split their income, (2) only partially split their 
income, or (3) keep their finances completely separate.
B. How Do These Rules Apply to Same‑Sex Couples?
Same‑sex couples are, of course, ineligible to file a joint federal income 
tax return because they are not “a husband and wife.” Thus, even if they 
96. Id.
97. See Cong. Budget Office, For Better or for Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax 
29–30 (1997) (indicating that, under the basic measure of the marriage penalty/bonus, 21 
million couples paid a marriage penalty, 25 million couples received a marriage bonus, and 
3 million couples neither paid a marriage penalty nor received a marriage bonus in 1996).
98. Provisions other than the tax rate schedules also contribute to the marriage penalty. For 
example, the marriage penalty is exacerbated whenever a married couple is only afforded 
the same tax benefit as a single individual even though each of the spouses could qualify 
for that benefit separately. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. § 221 (2008) (providing the same monetary 
ceiling for educational interest deductions for single individuals and married couples, who 
are compelled to file jointly to obtain this benefit) with id. § 121 (doubling the amount of gain 
that can be excluded from gross income on the sale of a principal residence in the case of a 
married couple filing a joint return).
99. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 787 (1997); Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Tax Laws Governing 
Joint and Several Tax Liability, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 261 (2004); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, 
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income‑Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 
Hastings L.J. 63 (1993).
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are permitted to file a joint return for state income tax purposes, a same‑sex 
couple must file two separate “single” returns for federal income tax purposes. 
Incidentally, this disparity in treatment increases the reporting burden and 
cost of compliance for same‑sex couples in states that legally recognize their 
relationships. Because some of these states use the federal income tax return 
as a starting point for computing their own taxes, same‑sex couples often find 
it necessary to translate their two “single” federal returns into a mock “joint” 
federal return before they can then complete their “joint” state tax return.100
Because they cannot be considered married for federal tax purposes, it is 
often noted that same‑sex couples can avoid the marriage penalty. This point 
is supported by citations to studies such as the 2004 Congressional Budget 
Office report estimating that, if the federal government and all fifty states were 
to recognize same‑sex marriage, there would be a small, positive impact on 
federal tax revenues due, in part, to the operation of the marriage penalty.101 
Yet, the individuals making these points seldom recognize that these studies 
are based on incomplete information and questionable assumptions. The CBO 
study, for example, readily admits the problems associated with: (1) accurately 
identifying the number of same‑sex couples in the population; (2) predicting 
the number of same‑sex couples who would marry, if permitted to do so; and 
(3) reconstructing these couples’ income and assets based on limited data.102 
Recalling the discussion above regarding the exemption of same‑sex couples 
from the Code’s attribution rules,103 one can only wonder about the extent to 
which stereotypes about lesbian and gay men—and particularly the myth of 
affluence—wittingly or unwittingly color the assumptions upon which these 
studies are based.
Even putting aside the additional burdens imposed on same‑sex couples 
when they file their state tax returns and the questionable results of studies 
regarding the effect of the marriage penalty on same‑sex couples, those 
who argue that same‑sex couples are financially better off by not having the 
government recognize their relationships for tax purposes miss the mark in 
an important respect. In contrast to married different‑sex couples, same‑sex 
100. See Catherine Martin Christopher, Note, Will Filing Status Be Portable? Tax Implications 
of Interstate Recognition of Same‑Sex Marriage, 4 Pitt. Tax Rev. 137, 141, 143, 144, 145–46 
(2007).
101. Cong. Budget Office, The Potential Budgetary Impact of Recognizing Same‑Sex Marriages 
2, 3 (2004), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/06‑21‑SameSexMarriage.pdf.
102. Id.; see also James Alm et al., Wedding Bell Blues: The Income Tax Consequences of 
Legalizing Same‑Sex Marriage, 53 Nat’l Tax J. 201 (2000).
103. See supra Part III.
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couples must be cognizant of the tax ramifications of pooling their income. 
Where the two do not contribute to the pool in exactly equal amounts, the 
partner who contributes more to the pool has effectively made a transfer 
to the partner who contributes less. Without the income‑splitting privilege 
and the exemption from income and gift tax for transfers between spouses 
afforded by §§ 1041 and 2523, the couple must determine the character—and 
tax consequences—of the amount transferred between them.
To take a concrete example, let’s consider the situation faced by my sister 
Elyse and her partner Cindy. Like many same‑sex couples,104 they have 
children—in fact, they now have three. Before the birth of their first child, my 
sister left her job. For more than 4½ years, Elyse chose to stay at home and care 
for their children. During that time, Cindy worked in the paid labor market 
to support their family and was the sole earner.105 Had they been able to file a 
joint federal income tax return during that time, they would have received a 
marriage bonus (i.e., Cindy would have paid less federal income tax than she 
did filing her “single” returns during that period). But Cindy and Elyse have 
more to worry about than just missing out on the marriage bonus. During 
the time that Elyse was not working, Cindy was the only one contributing to 
the financial pool. By supporting Elyse, Cindy made a series of transfers to 
her that need to be characterized for both income and gift tax purposes to 
determine whether Cindy actually owed even more tax.
For income tax purposes, there exists a variety of different potential 
characterizations for the transfers between Cindy and Elyse. For example, 
Cindy might be treated as having made a gift each time the mortgage and 
utility bills were paid, a trip was made to the grocery store, or a withdrawal was 
made from the ATM.106 If so, Cindy would continue to pay income tax on her 
104. At the time of the 2000 census, approximately 22% of all households headed by male 
same‑sex couples in the United States had children living with them and approximately 
34% of all households headed by female same‑sex couples in the United States had children 
living with them. Tavia Simmons & Martin O’Connell, U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 
Special Reports: Married‑Couple and Unmarried‑Partner Households: 2000, at 9 tbl.4 
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr‑5.pdf.
105. Moreover, now that my sister has returned to the paid labor market, the significant differential 
in their pay means that the problem described in the text above persists. My sister wished 
to find part‑time work, but was unable to do so. The full‑time job Elyse got is in a different 
field from the one that she worked in before having children, and it pays far less than the 
work that she did before. Indeed, for now, her pay barely covers the cost of childcare and, 
therefore, adds little to Cindy and Elyse’s financial pool.
106. Patricia A. Cain, Same‑Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 Tul. J.L. & Sexuality 97, 
114–15 (1991).
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wages,107 and Elyse would pay no income tax on those gifts.108 Alternatively, 
the pooling might be characterized as a support arrangement.109 In that case, 
Cindy would still be subject to income tax on her wages, and Elyse would 
pay no income tax on the support payments.110 A more frightening alternative 
would require both Cindy and Elyse to pay income tax on the transfer—on 
the ground that it constitutes payment for Elyse’s household services or, 
more simply, technically constitutes “income” to each of them.111 Yet another 
possibility is that the transfer could represent some combination of the above 
(e.g., part support, part gift; part support, part income; or part gift, part 
income).
Already dizzy from the array of potential income tax characterizations for 
these transfers, Cindy and Elyse must consider these same transfers from a gift 
tax perspective as well. Those transfers can also be characterized in a variety 
of ways for gift tax purposes—each with their own specific tax consequences. 
For example, the transfers might be treated as taxable gifts from Cindy to 
Elyse.112 Alternatively, the transfers might be treated as payments in exchange 
for Elyse’s household services, in which case the transfers will escape gift tax—
but, as described above, trigger income tax.113 Another possibility is that the 
transfer might be characterized as a support payment, which would escape 
gift tax (just as it escapes income tax).114 Yet another possibility is that the 
transfer could represent some combination of the above (e.g., part nontaxable 
support payment, part taxable gift or part nontaxable payment for services, 
part taxable gift).
You might be inclined to dismiss these gift tax complications on the ground 
that the gift and estate taxes are imposed on only a small slice of the taxpaying 
population; namely, the wealthiest among us. But if gift tax were imposed 
107. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930). Registered domestic partners and married 
same‑sex couples in California should be eligible for the income‑splitting privilege even in 
the absence of being able to file a joint federal income tax return because they are subject to 
California’s community property regime. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S 101 (1930). The IRS 
has, however, taken the position that same‑sex couples in California are ineligible for income 
splitting. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 2006‑08‑38 (Feb. 24, 2006). This position appears to be 
driven more by ideology than by sound application of the tax laws, and it has come in for 
strong criticism. E.g., Patricia A. Cain, Relitigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community Income 
of California Registered Domestic Partners, 111 Tax Notes 561 (2006); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., 
No Income Splitting for Domestic Partners: How the IRS Erred, 110 Tax Notes 1221 (2006).
108. I.R.C. § 102 (2008).
109. Cain, supra note 106, at 115–16.
110. 1 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 43, ¶ 10.2.6; Cain, supra note 106, at 116.
111. Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried 
Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 1240, 1244–62 (1980); see also Patricia A. Cain, The Income 
Tax: Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 471, 476 (1997).
112. Cain, supra note 106, at 125; Wolk, supra note 111, at 1275–81.
113. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512‑8 (as amended in 1992).
114. Rev. Rul. 68‑379, 1968‑2 C.B. 414.
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on transfers between members of a same‑sex couple—that is, on every rent or 
mortgage payment, on every purchase of clothing, and even on purchases of 
food—then this transfer tax on the wealthy would effectively become a sales 
tax imposed on a broad swath of the lesbian and gay community. As soon as 
the total amount of transfers from Cindy to Elyse exceeded the gift tax annual 
exclusion ($13,000 in 2009),115 Cindy would begin spending down her unified 
credit, which is currently capped at $1 million.116 As a single‑earner with jointly 
held property in an area with a high cost of living, Cindy would easily exceed 
the annual exclusion and spend down her unified credit each year. Once her 
unified credit has been exhausted, which is a distinct possibility over the course 
of a long‑term relationship (or even a series of long‑term relationships), Cindy 
would begin paying gift tax at the eye‑popping rate of forty‑one percent.117 
Thus, for same‑sex couples, gift taxation is a possibility whose importance 
should neither be trivialized nor ignored.118
Finally, it is worth noting that, because the income tax and the gift tax 
operate independently, the characterization of a single transfer from Cindy to 
Elyse need not be consistent across these taxes.119 In other words, just because 
a transfer is characterized as a gift for gift tax purposes does not mean that 
it must be characterized as a gift for income tax purposes. In practice, this 
results in the further multiplication of the potential tax characterizations for 
the transfers from Cindy to Elyse. It also opens the door to the possibility of 
truly punitive taxation of same‑sex couples. For example, a transfer might be 
characterized as income to both Cindy and Elyse for income tax purposes 
and as a taxable gift from Cindy to Elyse for gift tax purposes.120 This 
would result in a portion of Cindy’s income being subject to triple taxation. 
While pondering this terrifying possibility, it is worth recalling that married 
different‑sex couples need not worry about any of this, due to the combination 
of the income‑splitting privilege and §§ 1041 and 2523.
Faced with a veritable constellation of potential tax characterizations and 
high financial stakes, same‑sex couples, such as Cindy and Elyse, who pool 
their income and investments must examine all of the possibilities and settle 
on the appropriate tax treatment for any transfer between them. Neither 
115. Rev. Proc. 2008‑66, § 3.30, 2008‑45 I.R.B. 1107.
116. I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1) (2008).
117. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of Treasury, Instructions for Form 709, at 12 (2008). In the 
absence of congressional action, this rate temporarily drops to 35% in 2010 and then returns 
to 41% in 2011. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107‑16, §§ 511(d), (f)(3), 901, 115 Stat. 38, 70–71, 150.
118. See Cain, supra note 89, at 696, for a story about the IRS asserting on audit that all transfers 
from one (i.e., the wealthier) partner to the other were taxable gifts.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6 (1962); Comm’r v. Beck’s Estate, 129 F.2d 
243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942).
120. Cain, supra note 106, at 124–25; Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same‑Sex Couples, 72 Denv. 
U. L. Rev. 359, 375 (1995).
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Congress nor the IRS has made this task any easier, as they both have been 
conspicuously silent on the question of how the tax laws apply to same‑sex 
couples. Yet, despite this lack of guidance, the tax laws attach a presumption 
of correctness to whatever tax treatment the IRS deems appropriate (after 
the fact and without any advance public notice) and place the burden on 
same‑sex couples to prove that their chosen treatment is correct.121 If, on audit, 
the couple fails to carry this burden, they may find themselves liable not only 
for additional tax but also for interest and penalties (if they cannot show 
reasonable cause for the failure).122 The IRS has, in fact, used this procedural 
advantage against lesbian and gay taxpayers on audit.123
Even if a couple manages to win the battle with the IRS over an alleged 
failure appropriately to characterize the transfer between them, they may 
find that the war is far from over. In addition to settling on an appropriate 
tax characterization for the transfer, same‑sex couples must comply with 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are ostensibly designed to 
help verify the accuracy of their tax returns. For income tax purposes, each 
taxpayer is required to “keep such permanent books of account or records…as 
are sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or 
other matters required to be shown by such person in any return.”124 Likewise, 
for gift tax purposes, each taxpayer is required to “keep such permanent books 
of account or records as are necessary to establish the amount of his total gifts 
…together with the deductions allowable in determining the amount of his 
taxable gifts, and the other information required to be shown in a gift tax 
return.”125 Furthermore, if a taxpayer makes gifts to a person in excess of the 
annual exclusion, she is required to list separately on her gift tax return each 
and every gift made during the calendar year to that person, including gifts 
that are not taxed because of the annual exclusion.126
In practice, these requirements impose an impossible compliance burden 
on same‑sex couples. The tax laws essentially require same‑sex couples to keep 
records documenting every penny that they spend, save, or give away. Every 
trip to the grocery store, the clothing store, and the bank must be documented 
to determine who spent what and on whom. Without these records, the couple 
will find it difficult, if not impossible, to counter IRS assertions about the size 
or character of the transfer between them. Even couples who avoid pooling 
121. Tax Ct. R. 142(a)(1); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976); Welch v. Helvering, 
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The recordkeeping issues described in the text below make it unlikely 
that same‑sex couples will benefit from the burden‑shifting provisions in § 7491. See I.R.C. 
§ 7491(a)(2)(A) (2008) (limiting burden shifting to taxpayers who have “complied with the 
requirements under this title to substantiate any item”).
122. Infanti, supra note 7, at 790–97.
123. See Cain, supra note 89, at 696–97; see also Infanti, supra note 9, at 433–34.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001‑1(a) (as amended in 1990).
125. Id. § 25.6001‑1(a) (as amended in 1977).
126. Id. § 25.6019‑3(a) (as amended in 1994).
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or carefully avoid differing contributions to the pool may be tripped up by 
these recordkeeping requirements because, without the appropriate records, 
the couple may find it difficult to disprove the existence of an asserted transfer 
between them.
Such a crushing (not to mention insulting) recordkeeping and reporting 
burden can only breed noncompliance. Whether intentional or unintentional, 
this noncompliance may give the IRS an opportunity to increase the amount 
of additional tax owed and to impose penalties. Furthermore, there is the 
potential for criminal liability for those who either throw up their hands at the 
impossibility of the task or who refuse to acquiesce in their own oppression. 
Again, married different‑sex couples need not worry about these reporting 
requirements because transfers between them are rendered essentially 
irrelevant by the combination of the income‑splitting privilege and the 
protection afforded by §§ 1041 and 2523.
And just as married different‑sex couples may continue to share income 
after the end of their relationship, so may same‑sex couples. Yet, even though 
divorcing different‑sex couples are afforded elective access to continued 
income splitting for tax purposes through the alimony inclusion–deduction 
regime of §§ 71 and 215, same‑sex couples continue to be dogged by the 
same uncertainties about the tax treatment of sharing income (along with the 
associated reporting and recordkeeping requirements) after their relationship 
has ended as they were during their relationship. It is simply unclear how 
continued transfers of income from one partner to the other after the end of 
their relationship will be characterized and treated for federal income and gift 
tax purposes.127
C. Policy Issues
Horizontal equity is again an issue here, but in a different way. Instead of 
presenting a stark choice between being subject to current tax or not (e.g., in 
the case of fringe benefits or property transfers), the income‑splitting privilege 
raises interesting questions of visibility versus invisibility. The ability to file 
a joint federal income tax return (and the accompanying protections of §§ 
1041 and 2523) affords married different‑sex couples predictable (though not 
always, from their perspective, favorable) tax treatment. Though Congress 
has told same‑sex couples that they cannot have access to the set of tax rules 
applicable to married different‑sex couples, both Congress and the IRS “have 
utterly failed to provide meaningful guidance on how the Code should be 
applied to same‑sex couples, sometimes even in the face of direct pleas for 
such guidance from conscientious taxpayers.”128
127. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 805, 841–42 (2008); 
Chase, supra note 120, at 391.
128. Infanti, supra note 9, at 427 (emphasis added).
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This difference in treatment is neither benign nor accidental.129 Through 
the application of DOMA to the tax laws, the federal government clearly 
attempts to banish same‑sex relationships from sight by creating every 
incentive for same‑sex couples to retreat to the invisibility of the closet (i.e., to 
file returns and statements with the IRS that do not connect one partner with 
the other in any way) in an effort to avoid detection and punishment. This 
overt hostility toward same‑sex couples stigmatizes them by branding their 
relationships inferior to those of different‑sex couples. In effect, the tax laws at 
once embody and perpetuate societal prejudice, discrimination, and hostility 
toward lesbians and gay men by giving such activity the imprimatur of the 
federal government.
Conversely, echoing the earlier discussion in connection with property 
transfers, the recordkeeping and reporting requirements for same‑sex couples 
represent not only an onerous burden but also a severe invasion of privacy. As 
mentioned above, after Lawrence v. Texas,130 the government can no longer break 
into bedrooms to determine with whom and how lesbians and gay men have 
sex, but it can still use the tax laws to knock on the front door, come in, and 
probe the couple’s every financial move. In contrast, the tax laws effectively 
afford married different‑sex couples a privileged zone of privacy (or, if you will, 
the privilege of being visibly invisible) by treating them as a single economic 
unit—because transfers within the couple generally have no tax consequences, 
the government has no need to inquire about them.
VII. Some Parting Thoughts
As happens when broaching any “controversial” issue in the classroom, 
bringing sexual orientation and gender identity into the teaching of tax 
will sometimes excite the students, sometimes generate lively and respectful 
discussions, and at other times just fall flat. Honestly, there is no way to 
eliminate the possibility of adverse results, and a few students will invariably 
feel disgruntled because they are not receptive to, or comfortable with, 
discussing sexual orientation or gender identity under any circumstances. In 
the process of trial and error that is teaching, I have learned to avoid being 
distracted by a few outliers and to focus instead on my general audience, 
which is composed of law students who remain open to perspectives different 
from their own and to persuasion based on logical argument.
129. 
Far from finding themselves in a presumptively cooperative relationship, lesbian and 
gay taxpayers must contend with a federal government that has already declared itself 
openly hostile to them. The federal government has enacted legislation that overtly 
discriminates against same‑sex couples; has generally refused to provide guidance 
on the tax treatment of same‑sex couples in areas left unclear by that legislation; has 
provided unsound, ideologically‑motivated guidance when it has spoken; and has 
used its tactical advantages to persecute lesbian and gay taxpayers.
 Id. at 434–35.
130. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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In keeping with this idea of being attentive to one’s audience, I have 
merely provided the raw material here for bringing LGBT issues into the tax 
classroom. How a given teacher decides to use this raw material will depend 
on a number of factors, including the composition of the student body and 
the particular tax course being taught. Thus, even though the discussion 
in this essay often draws together material covered in different tax courses 
to provide a complete picture of how LGBT individuals experience the tax 
laws, it will be necessary in the classroom to adjust the level of detail to suit 
the context. For example, the discussion of property transfers above entailed 
coverage of the income, gift, and estate tax consequences of such transfers. 
In a basic income tax course, one might skip some or all of the estate and 
gift tax aspects of property transfers or simplify the discussion greatly so as 
not to confuse students unnecessarily and draw their attention away from the 
general point of the discussion. In contrast, in an estate and gift tax course, 
most (if not all) students will have taken the basic income tax course already, 
and a fuller discussion of the interaction between these taxes will not only 
be appropriate, but desirable—so that students can begin to see that different 
taxes do not operate in isolation, but interact with each other. In this regard, it 
is also helpful to weave these discussions into the larger fabric of the course—
using them to make or reinforce general points—instead of treating them as 
token discussions.
In addition, depending upon personal preference and the tolerance of 
students for a more intimate class setting, the narratives that frame the discussion 
of LGBT issues could be told as a story in the classroom, as I generally do, or 
they could be written out as a note or a problem for the students to consider 
as they complete the assigned reading for class. Moreover, for those who do 
not wish to personalize the narratives by drawing upon their own experiences 
(or for those tax teachers who are not themselves LGBT), I would encourage 
borrowing freely from the narratives in this essay. Personal vulnerability is not 
a necessary ingredient for making LGBT issues relevant to students. In the 
end, any story that provides a concrete situation that students can understand 
and relate to will serve to raise the consciousness of heterosexual students 
about the impact of the tax laws on LGBT individuals. At the same time, 
telling these stories will improve the climate for LGBT students by affirming 
the value of LGBT perspectives on the law and validating the experience that 
LGBT students bring to the tax classroom.
